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Abstract 
 
Having passed successive legislation in the past two decades to expand its use of the Japan 
Self Defense Force (JSDF), Japan has emerged from its post-war ‘pacifist’ shackles to assume 
a range of security roles that are typically associated with so-called ‘normal nations’. This 
article addresses how these have been crystallised in the form of an indefinitely-termed 
overseas base on the Horn of Africa, in Djibouti. Careful examination of pertaining Diet 
minutes, media discourse and government ministry papers suggests that the risks identified 
with this facility’s realization and status have been fundamentally recalibrated, allowing its 
presence and operational diversification to go largely unnoticed and unopposed – both 
domestically and overseas – despite representing a seemingly radical departure from common 
sense interpretations of Japan’s antimilitarist constitution.      
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Djibouti and the development of Japanese foreign policy  
In light of China’s rise and fluctuations in US security strategy, particularly under the 
administration of Donald Trump, Japan’s shifting foreign policy trajectory has been 
characterised as pivotal to the contemporary dynamics of international security in East Asia.1 
In this context, the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF)’s expanding overseas roles have drawn 
extensive attention from within Japan, across East Asia and throughout the wider international 
community – primarily as part of concerns over geostrategic competition between Beijing and 
Tokyo.2 A central feature of recent Japanese endeavours in this area has been the consistent 
and increasing state-led circumvention and reinterpretation of Japan’s nominally pacifist 
constitution3, which prohibits the establishment of an army and the use of warfare as a means 
of conflict resolution.4  
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The acceleration of this process began by actively promoting multi-state UN-led peace keeping 
operations (PKO) during the 1990s, partly in response to accusations of ‘cheque-book 
diplomacy’5, following Japan’s commitment of cash rather than manpower to the 1991 Gulf 
War in Iraq. Thereafter, maverick Prime Minister, Koizumi Junichirō, instrumentalized the 
9/11 World Trade Center attacks of 2001 to pass special measure laws, resulting in the sending 
of troops to (non-combat zones in) post-2003 Iraq and the refuelling of US warships conducting 
strikes in Afghanistan. The current right-of-centre administration led by Pirme Minister Abe 
Shinzō has now built on these precedents, passing a series of laws, culminating in the so called 
war bill, or anzenhoshokanrenhō, of September 2015. This controversial legislation for the first 
time officially legalizes certain conditions for collective self-defence, allowing potential 
engagement in live-combat overseas. Lying in close proximity to war-torn Somalia and South 
Sudan, where JSDF troops have already been dispatched, therefore, makes the diversifying role 
of the military facility in Djibouti of heightened significance. And yet, while pervious special 
measures and the war bill itself received widespread publicity and in-depth academic analysis6, 
Japan’s establishment of a de facto overseas military base on the Horn of Africa has been 
offered comparatively scant coverage in any form.  
 
This article, therefore, seeks to address the dearth of literature dedicated to Tokyo’s activities 
involving this facility. By assessing parliamentary and media discourses which have addressed 
the base, in addition to documenting the size and scope of Japan’s operations in Djibouti, the 
article explains the base’s relevance in terms of representing a case study of how institutional 
changes, supported by the recalibration of related risks, have allowed Japan to develop a 
globally active security agenda. In the case of Djibouti, this has been given elevated 
significance by the multiple military forces now stationed in the tiny African state, located in 
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a pivotal position adjacent to vital global shipping lanes.7 The gravity of Japan’s base in 
Djibouti diversifying its operational capabilities is made all the more evident when considering 
that China, as one of Japan’s principal security rivals, has also established a new military base 
in the same country, linked to its One Belt One Road (OBOR) development project through 
central Asia.8 In this context, the Djibouti base can also be expected to become a key site of 
strategic competition as the US-Japan alliance challenges Chinese interests seeking to invest 
further in African infrastructure and gain political leverage to exploit natural resources in 
volatile regions.9   
 
In the Japanese case, the conception and construction of an indefinitely scheduled mid-term 
military base which accommodates JSDF air, sea and ground forces – as well as the heavily 
armed Japan Coast Guard (JCG) – in order to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden, was realized 
in Djibouti in 2011. Initially labelled as an ‘activities hub’, or katsudō kyoten, by the Japanese 
Government10, the mission of this facility is ostensibly to work closely with other foreign forces 
in the region to provide protection against piracy for Japan’s international shipping lanes and 
other commercial interests. However, under the Abe-led Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
coalition, moves to further bolster Japan's geo-military power have, as many anticipated11, been 
forthcoming. Aside from the above-stated war bill, these changes have thus far been relatively 
modest and pragmatic in nature, but politicians, bureaucrats and security experts are now 
developing the potential for Japan to create and legalise more advanced capabilities.12 And, 
despite US Defense Secretary, James Mattis’, reassurances over upholding protection of 
Japanese territories under the US-Japan alliance13, rumbustious rhetoric from President Trump 
– demanding greater burden sharing in the international security roles played by its allies – has 
already seen Japan respond proactively, dispatching its largest war ship to accompany massing 
US forces off the coast of North Korea.14    
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In light of these developments, this article elucidates how the JSDF base in Djibouti, in tandem 
with the promotion of an enhanced military capability, represents a recalibration of risk that 
has facilitated extensive institutional change in Tokyo’s security apparatus. Its original 
contribution, therefore, lies primarily in terms of providing an analysis of how complex security 
risks have been mediated via discourse in order to legitimise policy changes, as made tangible 
in the Djibouti base case. These include risks often not conceptualized within the same 
framework of analysis, such as the risks identified with Japan being attacked by pirates or rogue 
states versus the risks manifest in Japan alienating itself regionally, or globally, by antagonizing 
China and other East Asian neighbours through rearmament and military reassertion. The 
Djibouti base is, therein, examined as an empirically unique case study, which supports the 
argument that Japan is significantly redefining its security strategy and diversifying its military 
capabilities. 
 
Risk (recalibration) is defined here in line with Beck, Adam and van Loon’s definition15, which 
posits that the amelioration of one set of risks results, inevitably, in the intensification of others, 
as subsidiary risks are created. This is applied to the present study in terms of internalizing 
threats to create a given set of options16, as part of a process of securitization.17 Recalibration, 
in this sense, refers not only to the raising or lowering of the perceived level of a given risk, 
but also to the form in which it is reframed and contextualized – in distinction from its previous 
calibration. Typically, this decouples the risk’s framing from the actual probabilities of 
incurring harm. This process is readily illustrated by juxtaposing risks that are rarely compared 
directly, but which highlight the inaccuracy of their (public) framing. For example, Nassim 
Taleb compares the portrayal of risks posed by venomous plants and terrorists (terrorists posing 
a far lower risk in terms of the probability of inflicting actual harm, despite their exaggerated 
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influence in justifying security policy formation).18 Concordantly, former UK government 
advisor on narcotics, David Nutt, proposed that Ecstasy was only considered a higher risk than 
horse riding because of its (public) framing and subsequent calibration.19 In the Djibouti case, 
similarly diverse risks are examined in terms of how they are articulated through Tokyo’s 
multi-layered state institutions, including the National Diet houses and government ministries, 
as well as via combinations of other state, market and societal actors, in order to effect policy 
change.20  
 
Following a brief assessment of related literature and justification of data sources, three 
intersecting sub-spheres of empirical discussion are explored. First, the form in which Japan’s 
mechanisms of state security are undergoing fundamental institutional change as a function of 
recalibrated risks, and why this matters in the Djibouti case, is addressed. The objective here 
is to examine how institutions such as parliamentary committees, the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and kantei (prime minister’s office), in addition 
to other influential actors, including Japan’s mainstream media corporations, are both driving 
and responding to shifting (re)calibrations of risk effected at the state level. The article then 
moves on to document how the operation of the JSDF facility on Djibouti explains the extent 
of this institutional change. The aim here is to examine the creation, operation and remit 
(rationale) of the Djibouti base as a case study illustrative of how Japan has recalibrated risks 
in order to substantively change the role of its overseas security functions. Finally, this is linked 
to how the potential realization of enhanced military capabilities further illuminates the 
direction of travel and potential impact of these institutional changes. The goal here is to 
analyse the current status and roles of Japan’s security forces, as operationalized from Djibouti, 
in order to explain what the possible implications are of enhanced weapons capabilities being 
deployed in the future. 
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Extending extant understandings of Japan’s expanding military role 
Thus far, coverage of the Djibouti base has been limited mainly to low-profile news articles 
covering the stationing of forces and details of their operational tasks. 21  In this context, 
investigation into the relationship between establishment of the Djibouti facility and discussion 
of enhanced military capabilities is required. Not least, because it is an area with evident 
ramifications for Japan’s emerging global security policy and associated great power rivalries 
– such as vis-à-vis China.22 Moreover, despite the gravity of nascent institutional changes in 
this regard, the base on Djibouti is yet to be thoroughly examined in terms of the development 
of enhanced and interoperable (with US forces) military capabilities and legislation facilitating 
increased JSDF proactivity, particularly in terms of its cumulative relationship. These aspects 
are sparsely documented within the extant academic literature, and across popular media and 
professional data base sources – as evidenced, for example, by the limited references listed on 
Japan’s comprehensive national news database, NikkeiTelecom21.23  
 
Contrastingly, in regard to more effective military capabilities, scholarly attention has mostly 
been focused towards a potential pre-emptive strike capability for Japan to counter risks 
supposedly posed by North Korea and, less directly, by China. Japanese scholarship on this 
issue is, thereby, driven primarily by a combination of journalists, defence specialists and 
politicians covering Korean, Chinese or Asia-Pacific affairs.24 In order, then, to productively 
incorporate Japan’s activities in Djibouti into the discussion from this narrow context, the focus 
on institutional changes allows us to draw more eclectically on a wider range of literature 
covering Japan’s supposedly “reluctant realism”25, “resentful realism”26, and the on-going 
process of re-militarization itself. 27  In addition, counter arguments which view the 
normalization of Japanese military capabilities and facilities as being precisely that, normal, 
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rather than representing any wholesale move to recapture former Japanese imperial power or 
expand its global military footprint can also be accounted for.28 Therein, by combining an 
institutionally-focused critique of these approaches with a critical analysis of the risks being 
recalibrated in response to external pressures, or gaiatsu 29 , as well as their interactive 
relationship with the formation of security policy, the substantive nature of change can be more 
effectively traced. Literature sources are thereby accessed intermittently throughout the text, 
as an aid to the interpretation of primary, discourse-based, data. The risk-focused approach in 
this regard builds upon extant scholarship driven by the Securitization literature30 , which 
integrates a synthesis of established International Relations theories with sociological 
conceptions of risk.31 
 
Assessing the data 
In line with the approach outlined above, the research for this article has primarily been carried 
out through qualitative critical discourse analysis (CDA). Discourse here refers to language-
in-use, which is publically (partially only in Japanese) accessible and has an identifiable 
political value. In other words, targeted sources of public discourse that are deemed, directly 
or otherwise, relevant to the political process form the corpus of evidence. This facilitates 
examination of how changes in language usage determine the identification and framing of 
specific actors and entities, such as pirates, rogue states or terrorists, for instance. These are 
then articulated via definitions and iterations (both explicit and implicit) of risks which, 
depending on internal (e.g. Japan’s energy security crisis) and external (e.g. pirates and 
terrorists) referent objects32, are recalibrated at the governmental level to justify agenda setting 
and, contingently, policy innovation and implementation.33  
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In the Djibouti case, the pertaining discourse on security is analysed by qualitatively examining 
a sample drawn from a selected range of parliamentary speakers, government ministries, 
commercial media sources and public figures. These focus specifically on National Diet 
minutes, which provide a data-source broadly representative of various governmental 
institutions and their critics that can be differentiated between over a designated time period. 
In the present article this is initiated from the Djibouti base’s proposal in 2010. This fixed time 
period also allows limited, complementary, quantitative analysis of the data sample to be 
undertaken, which generates additional interpretive results reflecting temporal change. The 
selected sampling of media and other literary discourse excerpts provides a further illustrative 
qualitative data set. Data is then contextualized with reference to concrete policy outcomes in 
order to demonstrate how greater explanatory power has been gained.  
 
Here, the data on Japan’s role in Djibouti is discussed in the postwar context of Japan’s tenuous 
position within the regional structure of states in East Asia, having been at loggerheads with 
its neighbours in recent decades despite increased economic inter-reliance (with China, South 
Korea etc.) and untapped potential (in North Korea). Amid this, the capacity to mitigate 
disputes on grounds of mutual gain and cooperation has in one sense been subordinated to a 
reframing of national identity and reassertion of geostrategic national interest. 34  This 
necessitates adopting an interpretation of the data that bridges constructivist and (neo)realist-
informed approaches. The coupling of an analytical focus on risk with an essentially 
constructivist framework, applied here to data typically associated with measuring processes 
of securitization 35 , provides a methodology which moves beyond the false conceptual 
dichotomy of international relations and domestic politics. The focus on diverse risks thereby 
offers a means to elucidate empirically how the specific case study of the Djibouti base can be 
utilized to illustrate the impact of contested normative ideas on policy innovation and execution. 
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This also takes the discussion of Japan’s security beyond the well-trodden path of individual 
threat perceptions, and into an area that emphasizes the decision making process – i.e. the 
choices involved in taking a particular set of risks, as well as the more commonly identified 
risks of incurring resulting harms. The following section initiates application of this discourse-
based approach by arguing that the substantive changes witnessed within Japan’s security 
institutions in recent decades have been effected through a process of recalibrating risks. These 
are highlighted concretely with reference to various legislative and budgetary innovations, 
including the inception and approval of the base facility in Djibouti itself. 
 
Institutional change as a function of recalibrated risks 
In the post-Cold War era, the upgrading of Japan’s Defence Agency (JDA) to the status of full 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) in 2007 represents a powerful symbolic illustration of Japan’s 
aspirations to become a globally recognized, normal (in terms of security roles and capabilities), 
international power. The upgrade came on the back of a series of special laws and provisions, 
mostly enacted by the Junichirō Koizumi-led government (2001-2006), which provided a 
platform for extensive new proactivity in the JSDF’s operational roles overseas.36 This shift 
was realised primarily by the executive, partly as a response to the newly identified threat of 
terrorism post-9/11, and took advantage of structural changes within Japan’s bureaucracy, 
which allowed the Prime Minister’s Office to increase its relative power.37 Laws such as the 
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) also set an early precedent in 
institutionalizing extra-constitutional use of Japan’s military and reinterpretation of the 
constitution, cased in rhetoric that repeatedly referred to increasingly diverse risks posed to 
Japan’s security.38 Amid this context, it should be noted that it was the first Shinzō Abe-led 
administration, following Koizumi, who oversaw the upgrading of the JDA to ministerial status, 
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and it is the current Abe government that continues to push for extensive institutional changes 
in the security sphere.39  
 
Indeed, although the facility on Djibouti has only recently been recognized and termed 
officially as an overseas military base, it has been realized as a result of incremental alterations 
to Japan’s executive and bureaucracy, and in tandem with the extensive curtailment of press 
freedoms under Abe’s leadership.40 These cumulative factors have allowed other activities to 
overshadow its relevance as Japan’s first long-term post-war military installation on foreign 
soil. In particular, as the Japanese public, press and political elite have witnessed overseas 
peace-keeping missions, logistical participation in the War in Iraq and refuelling assistance to 
US forces in Afghanistan in recent years, the striking nature – or shock-factor – of the Djibouti 
facility’s diverse military activities appears to have had minimal impact by comparison. 
Despite such public apathy (or lack of knowledge) a number of important stakeholders have 
sought to critically engage with these institutional changes relating to the establishment and 
operation of the facility in Djibouti – and, by extension, Japan’s anti-piracy operations more 
generally – though few have directly opposed the base on grounds of constitutional violation 
or broader concerns of expanding military operations. Vocal opposition Diet member, 
Yamauchi Kōichi, for example, cites concerns over the costing of JSDF anti-piracy missions 
as a rationale for either pulling out of the base, or at least shifting the impetus onto the JCG to 
defend Japan’s shipping lanes, concluding succinctly in one statement to the Diet that “Coast 
Guard ships are something like a whole digit’s worth cheaper [than JSDF vessels]”. 41 
Yamauchi has also put forward a detailed explanation of why personnel on the base should be 
withdrawn on the grounds that, having effectively eliminated piracy in the adjacent waters, the 
Japanese military’s mission is complete.42  
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Yet, mainstream disinterest and misrepresentation of the significance of the JSDF’s Djibouti 
base, both symbolically and logistically, has persisted since its inception. Something that is 
made all the more notable when considering that the Japanese government is also investing 
substantial sums of public funds in and around the base, including, for example, the 
construction of a four million US dollar regional centre for maritime training at Djibouti’s 
Doraleh Port.43 Such indifference can be seen as the result of how related security risks had 
already been recalibrated prior to the leasing of the base, and its expansion thereafter – 
effectively reducing its comparative level of controversy among media, the public and NGOs 
(peace promotion groups etc.) who might have been expected to oppose its establishment and 
diversification more vigorously. It also highlights how such risks as piracy, global terrorism, 
China’s rise and neighbouring military conflict continue to be mediated by Japanese state 
authorities and mainstream media sources in a form which accepts that risks will be incurred 
by JSDF personnel in their line of duty. This is now widely accepted as an unavoidable function 
of mitigating the supposedly exponentially growing risks attached to the defence of Japan’s 
national security, despite doubts about these JSDF missions adhering to the Japanese 
constitution.44 
 
Since the ending of the Cold War, these security concerns have been directed firstly at North 
Korea (DPRK) 45 , and more recently at China. 46  The dual threats of immediate military 
contingency stemming from the Korean Peninsula47 and an increasing geo-strategic challenge 
posed by Beijing’s perceived expansion48 has thereby been identified as presenting a highly 
significant and intensifying combination of risks for Japan, which necessitates greater 
proactivity from Tokyo more generally in the international security sphere.49 Building upon 
this momentum, in recent years the focus has been subtly expanded and diversified. Concretely, 
a shift has been made from essentially framing the two-prong military security threat alluded 
                                                                           Djibouti: Japan’s first post-war overseas base 
12 
 
to above, to include an expanded range of issues – though often implicitly or explicitly still 
linked to the DPRK and China – in order to portray an exponentially risky regional and global 
security environment. These have included global issues such as terrorism and environmental 
security, extending to areas pinpointed as particularly relevant to Japan’s national security, 
such as the issues of energy security and piracy used in the Djibouti case.  
 
In this regard, Japan’s low energy self-sufficiency has been highlighted in reference to its need 
for large-scale importation of fossil fuels and other materials via lengthy and exposed shipping 
lanes, thereby expanding the definition of self-defence at state and societal levels to include 
the securing of these vital supply arteries.50 This understanding has crystalized within political 
institutions such as the National Diet and pertaining ministries, and faced only very limited 
opposition from media and other mainstream societal actors, particularly in the face of energy 
procurement difficulties created by the March 2011 Fukushima disaster.51 For example, in the 
five years of Diet sessions since the establishment of the Djibouti base, only Satoshi Ueno 
(Japan Communist Party) raised, in 2013, direct concerns over the legality of ensuring energy 
security via a dubious interpretation of self-defence effectively enacted in the Gulf of Aden. 
Ueno posed the question to the prime minister: “Is it your intention to turn the JSDF into an 
army that possesses bases overseas, and in so doing greatly exceeds the objective of defending 
Japan?”.52 With the legislative changes which followed in effect making the JSDF in Djibouti 
exactly that, as discussed further below, it would seem that Ueno’s question has now all but 
been answered in the affirmative. 
 
Amidst this, while the identification of increased external threats by successive Japanese 
administrations is in itself well-documented in the extant literature 53 , the complex and 
cumulative internalization process through which it occurs is far less comprehensively 
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addressed. In particular, the recalibration of risks in this context has become central in 
disseminating what is by and large an agenda of threat inflation54, but which changes its target 
and expression depending upon the political needs of the time. This often-times appears to go 
largely unnoticed or unchallenged by both the wider public and rival political entities. Rather 
than being the result of active government concealment, however, this process mostly 
manifests itself in the subtle (re)framing of issues, and can be identified concretely through 
examination of the pertaining National Diet minutes, as well as in official (governmental) 
publications, statements and press releases.55  
 
Early Diet exchanges regarding Djibouti, for instance, though few in number, were focused 
primarily not on discussions of Japan’s diversifying security role, but rather within the framing 
of emergency measures taken as part of an international coalition to protect commercial ships 
against piracy. 56  As the years since the Djibouti facility’s opening have passed – and 
particularly since the Abe-led government has returned to power – this dialogue has shifted 
substantially in the direction of a narrative that propounds a necessity to protect Japan’s 
national security at home via proactive use of the JSDF abroad. As Abe stated in 2016, priming 
his message with the claim that the region remained dangerous despite piracy incidents in the 
Gulf of Aden being reduced from over 200 to zero, “Going forward under the rubric of 
proactive peace… and from the perspective that missions are being carried out effectively in 
lands far from Japan, we intend to consider now how best to make the most of increased JSDF 
activities from their base in Djibouti”.57 This effectively opens the way for the Djibouti base to 
play a leading role in Abe’s initiatives to reinterpret Japan’s antimilitarist constitution under 
the banner of ‘proactive peace’ (sekkyokuteki heiwashugi).58    
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Diet records are also illustrative of how this process has been articulated more broadly via 
mainstream political discourse. A year after the facility’s opening, and with typically scant 
media attention59, a one-year extension of the Djibouti base’s operation was agreed via a 
Cabinet decision, and triumphed by then Defense Secretary, Satoshi Morimoto, as “playing an 
extremely important role not only for shipping concerning Japan, but also in the safe passage 
of foreign ships”.60 This was applauded in the same Diet committee by Japan Coast Guard 
Chief, Sato Yuji, who also went on to claim that in terms of countering international piracy in 
the area, the JCG was now at the forefront of “active planning”. 61  Sixteen months on, 
Morimoto’s replacement, Onodera Itsunori, continued to express how security activities in 
Djibouti are being used as a fulcrum to propel the expansion and diversification of JSDF roles. 
Onodera articulated this with reference to increasing risks and protection against regional 
insecurity in strategic areas, asserting that “[JSDF] activities in far-off locations such as Africa 
are expected to increase” and that, as such, “in order to conduct cooperative activities for World 
peace, the status of existing facilities such as in Djibouti will need to be considered going 
forward”.62 In other words, via the recalibration of multiple security risks, within the first three 
years of the base’s establishment its usage was already on the cusp of being transformed from 
an emergency stop-gap measure designed to counter piracy across Japan’s primary shipping 
lanes, to an indefinitely stationed multi-function military base with a remit that included the far 
broader role of contributing to international peace and security.      
 
It should also be noted that government Diet speakers have mostly been reticent when it comes 
to publicizing the structure of the military facility itself. Indeed, while the threats that the base 
is claimed to respond to have been far from played down, and its role in anti-piracy has been 
framed as a necessary counter to changing risks, increases in references to the actual details of 
the Djibouti base have largely been made only when seemingly unavoidable, rather than 
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actively promoted or government-initiated. For example, LDP lawmaker, Ono Yasutada 
praised the Japan Self Defense Force and Japan Coast Guard’s “great achievements” in 
Djibouti in relation to antipiracy, but notably omitted reference to how their activities have 
actually been operationalized.63 In contrast, only opposition members traditionally opposed to 
increasing Japanese military activity overseas, such as from within the Japan Communist Party 
and other left-leaning parties, have been quick to identify the facility in Djibouti as a de facto 
base. These few-in-number sources have objected to the Djibouti facility’s potential for aiding 
US anti-terrorism efforts and other military activities, as well as the lack of transparency 
provided by the ruling LDP with regards operational and hardware specifics.64  
 
Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, the concrete fruits of substantive institutional change 
have been borne. And in recent years this has been further justified in the context of China’s 
increased power projection.65 It has also been pointed out by leading Diet lawmakers, for 
example with regards to Djibouti, that China could ultimately replace the US as the primary 
indefinite military presence in the country.66 This obviously complicates Japan’s antipiracy 
activities in the region, but can also be used to justify the revaluation of policy agendas. These 
are deemed to require a means to ameliorate not only risks posed to energy security by piracy, 
but also those emanating from an aggressively posturing (and now ‘risen’) China – a source of 
concern repeatedly raised in combination by both leading government ministers and 
mainstream media.67 In this regard, broad convergence of LDP rhetoric and media coverage is 
not coincidental, with a combination of legal restrictions being imposed upon all news items 
deemed controversial coming in tandem with the government-backed appointment of pro-Abe 
heads of Japan’s public broadcaster, NHK68, as well as the purging of more liberal media 
outlets.69  
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Recalibrations of risk have thereby included a diversifying set of international actors, and 
facilitated the blurring of the original supposed threat of maritime piracy identified specifically 
around the Gulf of Aden. This can also be exposed quantitatively, in terms of the number and 
scope of Diet references to Djibouti. Direct discussion of the facility across all chambers and 
committees almost doubled from 2012-2016, for example, and the issue of the Japanese 
military facility on Djibouti has now been debated in one form or another within six separate 
Diet bodies, including the Upper and Lower House Main Sessions, Budget Committee and 
Finance Committee, as well as committees relating to foreign policy and security, but has yet 
to face sustained opposition, other than from the far-left. 70  In this sense, despite the 
government’s apparent awkwardness in openly explaining the status of an overseas military 
base that appears dubious in constitutional terms71, the significance of its increasingly diverse 
functions is transforming the low profile of the facility into an unavoidable topic of high-level 
political debate. In light of this, the following section details both the actual operations of the 
Djibouti base and the lack of transparency, or at least clarity, surrounding them – exposing the 
poorly documented nature of key changes, and highlighting the growing importance of Japan’s 
first post-war overseas military hub. 
 
Redefining the JSDF facility in Djibouti  
Following the initial dispatch in 2009 of a small number of JSDF officers for the purposes of 
liaison and communications coordination 72 , an indefinite Japanese military presence was 
established in Djibouti in 2011.73 Although early deployments were to temporary facilities 
operating cooperatively with US and French forces, in 2010 the Japanese government approved 
the leasing of approximately 12 hectares of land northwest of Djibouti International Airport, at 
a cost of approximately 4.7 billion yen74; upon which, hangers, barracks and equipment have 
now been constructed, supporting approximately 300 JSDF troops as part of Japan’s new 
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activities hub (shinkatsudōkyoten). The stark absence of scholarly, political and media attention 
focused upon this far-away facility is, then, made all the more remarkable given its multi-fold 
usage by ground, air and maritime JSDF forces, in addition to armed JCG personnel – 
apparently all exempt from the constitutional constraints which forbid Japan’s possession of 
an army, air-force or navy. This is put into perspective when one considers the Djibouti 
facility’s unique status as Japan’s first postwar overseas military base, making it comparable 
to, for example, US bases hosting troops on Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan, which have, by 
comparison, faced vociferous public and political opposition throughout the Japanese 
archipelago.75  
 
Some of the dearth in coverage can be attributed to the base’s establishment having coincided 
approximately with the Great East Japan Earthquake and triple disaster of March 2011. 
Nevertheless, the lack of publicity afforded to this facility by successive administrations, 
despite diversifying its roles and activities, suggests a deliberate degree of caution being 
exercised by Japanese authorities. Therein, the government seeks to promote a more active 
security role – under the guise of Abe’s ‘proactive pacifism’ – through legislation such as the 
2015 war bill76, but at the same time maintains a relatively low-profile with regards to the 
actual operations that such legal changes potentially allow to be expanded.77 This reflects a 
recalibration of the contingent security risks. The external threat of international piracy, for 
example, has been projected in contradistinction from the government’s own internalized risks, 
such as those posed to its political capital by closer scrutiny of facilities or activities associated 
with militarization – as attributable to the base in Djibouti. This effectively avoids them being 
deemed unconstitutional by societal and media groups, and circumvents an area of potential 
political controversy. 
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To this end, the relatively opaque workings and disproportionately limited public coverage of 
the Djibouti base are not only visible in its lack of public exposure, but also within the 
administration’s own publications and internal systems of dissemination. For example, though 
covered briefly, very little explanation or details of the base are provided via official 
homepages or press releases of the pertaining ministries (MOD, MOFA, JCG). Unsolicited 
Diet references by ruling-party members that actively promote the facility in Djibouti are, as 
noted above, also extremely rare, despite the overall increase in its discussion. Only 20 of 79 
Diet statements referring to anti-piracy and the Gulf of Aden, for instance, included reference 
to Djibouti.78 In this sense, it can only be assumed that a raising of public awareness towards 
anti-piracy operations taking place – for the supposed primary purpose of defending 
commercial shipping lanes that sustain Japan’s energy security79 – has been juxtaposed with 
an under-emphasising of what form that protection is actually manifest in, i.e. a fully 
operational overseas military base. The understated depiction of the Djibouti facility in those 
terms80, even within the JSDF and other internal committees, appears to reinforce this point.  
 
Indeed, it is predominantly the non-military sections of government that appear most forthright 
in their exposition of diversified security activities in Djibouti. The increase and upgrading of 
military hardware, such as the facility’s (2016) proposed expansion to incorporate Bushmaster 
armored vehicles, C-130 transport aircraft and additional personnel  – presumably to rival 
China’s in-country capability and aid readiness for (re)dispatches to South Sudan and beyond81 
– has been combined with greater integration of civil and military spheres in Japan’s 
engagement in Africa. The JCG, for instance, has made use of the Act on Special Measures 
Concerning the Guarding of Japanese Ships in Pirate-Infested Waters to deploy armed Coast 
Guard officers onto MSDF ships off the coast of Djibouti, thereby setting a precedent for close 
JCG-JSDF cooperation outside of Japan’s immediate sphere of regional influence.82 
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Concomitantly, as an organization with long-standing institutionalized links across Africa, the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has also increased and diversified its activities 
in Djibouti in recent years – having first established an indefinite presence in 2000 with the 
opening of its office there. Of particular interest here is that while JICA’s mission has 
traditionally been one of providing funds for investment projects in core infrastructure – such 
as schools, roads and basic services – in Djibouti relations have been built with the incoming 
JSDF and JCG.83 In contrast, despite proactive efforts and engagement with over 150 members 
of Japan’s business community by the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority84, the JICA 
budget for non-military related projects in Djibouti leaves it outside of Japan’s top twenty 
recipient countries on the continent and there is a conspicuous absence of any mention of 
Djibouti in the most recent JICA Annual Report on Africa.85 This is particularly striking given 
that, through JICA, the Japanese government provided funding for the 2015 Tripartite 
Cooperation Agreement for Training of the Coast Guard Crew of the Republic of Djibouti. 
Concluded with Moroccan and Djiboutian authorities, this initiative is aimed at educating and 
training the Djibouti Coast Guard in order to enhance effective defence of its internationally 
pivotal coastal waters, but also serves to more broadly build relations between these states in 
security-related spheres.86  
 
Here too, then, the blurring of civil and military activities led by Tokyo in Djibouti could be 
seen to compete with those conducted by China, which indicate a move towards augmenting 
country-specific commercial investment in Africa with the ability to support it through the 
deployment of well-equipped armed forces.87 Yet, Japan’s leading business organizations and 
investors appear to have been primarily concerned with assuring safe passage of goods through 
the Gulf of Aden, and only in this sense explicitly support the increased and diversified JSDF 
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role, rather than viewing Djibouti as a priority destination for wider strategic investment.88 As 
such, although Japan’s base in Djibouti may allow geostrategic competition with its larger East 
Asian rival – particularly as JSDF forces are increasingly able to operate seamlessly with allies 
such as the US – Japan’s broader in-country investment pales in comparison to China’s 
dominant economic partnership with this tiny state, now hailed as the “gateway to Africa.”89 
In this sense, without an increase in private Japanese investment, it may become more 
politically problematic to publicly justify the stationing of an expensive multi-bodied military 
presence, particularly as local off-shore piracy has now effectively been eliminated.    
 
The lack of awareness towards JICA, JCG and JSDF activities in Djibouti, meanwhile, is 
further reflected in the public’s responses to and reported understandings of the base, whereby 
a decoupling of actual JSDF activities in Djibouti, from the mostly publically accepted 
construction of risks attached to anti-piracy operations in the Middle East, appears to have been 
achieved. In other words, the on-the-ground reality in Djibouti, to the extent that it is expressed 
publically by the current administration and its bureaucratic arms in the MOD and MOFA, has 
been miscast in a way that effectively distorts the precise nature of Japan’s substantial 
international security role. For example, according to government opinion polls, up to 63 per 
cent of respondents reported having a positive view of Japan’s anti-piracy operations, with only 
29 per cent in the negative.90 Yet, without access to further operational details, the majority of 
those polled are evidently not well-informed regarding how the Djibouti base operates or who 
is stationed there, and the facility is not explicitly included in poll questions. Indeed, a number 
of Asia and security specialists approached for this article, including in Japan, were unaware 
of the base’s existence! In this regard, leading members of the LDP-coalition are surely aware 
that precise knowledge of the facility in Djibouti, including the deployment of multiple JSDF 
and Coast Guard forces, is something that requires careful public relations management. Given 
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the current public embattlement of the LDP’s foreign policymakers, particularly following the 
railroading of the 2015 war bill, which was deemed unconstitutional even by the government’s 
own appointed independent expert91, it seems unlikely that Japan’s ruling administration have 
accidentally underexposed this constitutionally controversial issue. 
 
The capabilities and remit of the Djibouti facility, in the context of Japan’s expanding readiness 
to use force overseas, however, remain somewhat unclear, not least due to interoperability with 
other anti-piracy missions in the region, including US military personnel stationed immediately 
adjacent at Camp Lemonnier. Thanks to the signing of a revised exchange treaty between 
Foreign Minister, Fumio Kishida, and outgoing US Ambassador to Japan, Caroline Kennedy, 
the potential for supplying and receiving military parts in the case of serious security 
contingencies, for example, has been substantially increased.92 Furthermore, despite Japanese 
commanders making it clear that MSDF troops engaged in anti-piracy missions are acting 
legally in effective defence of Japan, this means that Japanese military personnel have the 
authority to open fire on suspected vessels in open water and shoot-to-kill on foreign soil if 
deemed to be in self-defence. 93   In addition, outgoing Defence Minister, Gen Nakatani, 
conceded as recently as January 2016 that the expansion and diversification of missions and 
roles from the Djibouti base, including those outside of antipiracy and related to war zones 
such as South Sudan, would be implemented.94 
 
Furthermore, based on the Abe administration’s current rhetoric, it is hard to imagine that any 
meaningful efforts will be made to scale back or bring an end to the JSDF troops’ stationing in 
Djibouti, despite no piracy incidents being reported since May 2012.95  Indeed, incoming 
Defense Minister, Tomomi Inada, made Djibouti her primary destination after being appointed. 
This in itself perhaps demonstrates a further recalibration of risk, based on the tacit 
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understanding that the reality of the base has been framed in a form that keeps it under the 
public radar of many otherwise fiercely antimilitarist stakeholders in Japan and overseas. In 
this respect, known for her revisionist views on Japan’s chequered political history, Inada 
would appear to have chosen Djibouti as her initial overseas visit in order to avoid risking 
further straining relations with, amongst others, China and South Korea by ceremonially 
commemorating the anniversary of Japan’s wartime defeat at the historically sensitive 
Yasukuni Shrine.96 Ultimately, despite Inada’s meeting with Djibouti’s heads of state97, which 
might have cast a concerted spotlight upon the issue of Japan’s first overseas post-war military 
base, once again minimal attention was given in both domestic and international media to the 
minister’s time spent on the Horn of Africa.  
 
This continuing indifference towards the status of the Djibouti facility would, then, appear to 
reflect at least two concrete changes: Firstly, this is in terms of the increasingly active role that 
has become expected of Japan’s military and political representatives overseas. Secondly, it 
has seen the government successfully construct a framing of possible Japanese use of force and 
long-term stationing abroad in a form that is presented as acceptable, something which would 
surely have encountered far broader and more fervent media criticism, political resistance and 
public concern in preceding post-war decades.       
 
The above once again highlights how institutional change appears to have been effected 
through a process of risk recalibration. This has involved state-based (government, military 
etc.) actors recalibrating risks identified with Japan’s vulnerability, in terms of Japan’s 
exposure to a lack of energy security in tandem with China’s perceived (global) rise and 
expansion. This contrasts with the down-grading of risks associated with the previously 
sensitive issue of Japanese military personnel facing the danger of being caught up in conflict 
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zones, and therefore being killed in combat overseas. In Djibouti and elsewhere, where there 
was previously a distinct dividing line (even in the context of, for instance, Japan’s various 
PKO operations) between external and internal risks, these concepts of security have subtly 
converged. The result is effectively a framing of domestic and international risks as being part 
of a seamless continuum which extends well beyond Japan’s national borders and immediate 
maritime concerns. This institutionalized recalibration of risk also coincides with moves 
towards a significant enhancement of Japan’s military capabilities, as examined below. 
 
The Djibouti base and enhanced military capabilities 
As noted above, Japan’s remilitarisation has been discussed extensively in the contemporary 
literature98, and with renewed vigour since the end of the Cold War and bursting of Japan’s 
economic bubble in 1991, particularly in light of China’s rise. 99  In this sense, direct 
geostrategic competition with China in Djibouti reinforces the view of many leading 
commentators who depict the incremental ending of an era, in terms of Japan’s supposedly now 
obsolete post-war foreign policy of separating politics and economics, or seikei bunri.100 The 
return to power of an Abe-led administration has further expedited this process, albeit 
sometimes without detailed specifications regarding how Japan’s military is to be upgraded 
and streamlined – the obvious dismantling of Japan’s ban on weapons exports and 
encouragement of advanced technological research via the MOD’s newly created Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics Agency notwithstanding. These initiatives have given rise to further 
joint inter-state projects in the security sphere, as part of Abe’s recent review of the Three 
Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.101  
 
In Djibouti, personnel stop-overs to and from operations in South Sudan, for example, suggest 
that the base may be being primed to support enhanced offensive logistics capabilities 
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developed in-line with these institutional changes, but it is not yet clear in exactly what form. 
Indeed, at present, the base itself acts as little more than a transit hub in this regard.102 
Nevertheless, an unprecedented level of operational integration with US forces103, including in 
antipiracy missions around the Gulf of Aden, combined with record high defence 
expenditure104, has resulted in the intensification of rival powers’ perceptions of Japan as a 
remilitarizing state seeking increased geo-strategic power projection through advanced military 
capabilities.105 From Tokyo’s perspective, conversely, an ongoing process of risk recalibration 
enacted in response to a portrayed diversification of security threats has been pivotal in 
justifying a shift towards developing more potent military firepower. This can now be projected 
not only from areas surrounding Japan, but also from as far away as the Horn of Africa. The 
significance of institutional changes within Japan’s security and foreign policymaking elites is 
once more, therefore, shown to be instrumental in the resulting shifts in policy trajectory. These 
are now materializing in outlying locations such as Djibouti, which might previously have been 
considered too high a risk for JSDF forces to incur. 
 
Both military technological enhancements and the political (re)interpretations of security risks 
that facilitate them are particularly salient with respect to the Djibouti case in so far as they 
illustrate the tangible extent of policy change and the potential it has to increase Japan’s global 
security role. The development of enhanced military capabilities also further emphasises the 
importance of Japan’s operational diversification on the Djibouti facility.106 In this sense, the 
base is not representative merely of a façade of greater proactivity in the international security 
sphere. For instance, Japan does now have the potential to carry out – albeit in a delegated role 
for the UN or defending the US and its allies – military operations in conflict zones, including 
nearby South Sudan and Somalia.107  
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In this context, the MOD has not only invested heavily in new weapons and logistics 
technology which can be utilized at great distances from Japan108, but has also begun an internal 
process of ‘structural transformation’.109 This includes, with direct reference to the “security 
consequences including further heightening of tension with neighbouring countries as well as 
increasing risks”110 caused by China’s actions in the South China Sea, strategically relocating 
state-of-the-art fighter aircraft throughout Japan in readiness to be scrambled into action from 
Hokkaido to Okinawa. In other words, despite its geographical distance, the establishment of 
the base in Djibouti has been incorporated seamlessly – and without drawing the attention often 
warranted by controversial changes to security policy – into a broader shift in national defence 
strategies and procurements. The American military’s controversial Osprey (MV-22) 
helicopters, previously deployed and shot down by pistol fire in South Sudan, for example, 
have also been procured, in addition to amphibious assault vehicles designed for the recovery 
of outlying islands. All of these acquisitions and deployments can be seen as symptomatic of 
the MOD’s institutional changes, as enshrined in Japan’s National Defense Programme 
Guidelines (NDPG) and Mid-term Reports111, brought under the jurisdiction of the National 
Security Council. These documents have been forthright in showcasing how Japan’s military 
continues to move towards ‘seamless’ integration with US forces. Moreover, the tacit 
acceptance of this de facto modus operandi creates the potential for further collaborative 
offensive capabilities to be developed and operationalized via the Djibouti base, without 
causing the kind of political controversy that might be expected from equivalent unilateral 
initiatives undertaken solely by Japan.      
 
Even through the realization of existing enhanced capabilities alone, making use of US 
logistical support for instance, the current administration and its associated bureaucracies have 
effectively devised a means by which to transfer recalibrated risks initially attached only to 
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China and North Korea to global maritime security activities – as manifest concretely in the 
establishment of the base in Djibouti. The instrumentalization of antipiracy missions in the 
Gulf of Aden has, in effect, thereby been utilized to enact substantive changes to the structuring 
of JSDF operations and the hardware it can operate. And, where previously the Government of 
Japan struggled to openly increase weapons capabilities for fear of a domestic and regional 
backlash, by integrating extensively with US military operations it is gradually circumventing 
constitutional controls in order to realize the long-held agenda of operationalizing “shared use 
of facilities [and enhanced intelligence and tracking information] by US forces and the 
JSDF”.112 This now includes expanding use of military equipment and personnel overseas, and 
at the same time reframes a set of globally extending risks in a form that consolidates Tokyo’s 
ability to justify increased spending on defence equipment and further redefine the JSDF’s 
international security role.      
 
As observed in the explicit (re)framing of piracy off the coast of Djibouti, the process by which 
this shift has been justified against a backdrop of supposedly increased security risks can be 
evinced via scrutiny of the pertaining political discourse. For example, as opposed to openly 
supporting the development of an enhanced independent offensive weapons capability, LDP 
lawmakers have increasingly focused upon the concept of heightened interoperability in the 
face of diversifying security risks. In the Diet, for instance, when asked by opposition 
parliamentarians to explain changes to JSDF operations capabilities, former Defence Minister, 
Gen Nakatani, repeatedly focused on the technical, logistical, necessity of Japan being able to 
seamlessly operate weapons systems and other military technology in integration with the US 
– in order to ameliorate a range of potential risks posed by hypothetical external military threats. 
This included Nakatani stating, in reference to the US-Japan Defence Guidelines agreed in 
2015, that,  
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“Here too, for these guidelines, I think that it can be considered as necessary that at all 
times we are able to cooperate to defend American military installations, which are 
themselves necessary for the defence of our country. As strategic action, this includes 
coping with armed attacks against Japan, such as cooperation in tactics against aerial 
and ballistic missile strikes”113    
Of particular note here is the assumption by Nakatani (and others in his administration) that 
the seamless interoperability of defence systems with the US has become an essential common 
sense norm in order to guard against security risks which are unknown in their extent, but 
purportedly tangible nonetheless. In this sense, although a more specific norm of endorsing 
enhanced military interoperability has been created, the rhetoric serves to illustrate how the 
risk recalibration process has led to the erosion of Japan’s antimilitarist norms and strengthened 
norms associated with bilateralism between Washington and Tokyo. This is in contrast to many 
previous post-war administrations, which in particular viewed closer military cooperation and 
interoperability of weapons systems with the US cautiously, or as nominally optional, if at 
times unavoidable. Such has now been reframed as an essential component of a mutually 
proactive international security policy.114 The risk that Japan could be drawn into US-led 
conflicts as a consequence of military cooperation also appears to have lost traction as a result. 
Not least, where the risks of entanglement were formerly forcefully asserted by prominent 
actors at state, market (commercial media etc.) and societal levels115, they are now mostly only 
voiced by a marginalised, typically left-leaning, few. 
 
Indeed, among other opposition members, even following the widely unpopular election 
victory of Donald Trump, which has heightened attention on security discourse, Diet debates 
have focused more upon the risks posed by Japan being seen to move too close to Trump as a 
potentially toxic and unpredictable individual leader, rather than those of embroilment in 
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existing US military operations per se. For example, former Vice Foreign Minister and current 
Democratic Party (minshinto) representative, Kira Shūji, having reinforced the “extreme 
significance” of cementing a strong and close US-Japan alliance, remarkably then went on to 
warn the ruling coalition of potential risks attached to the President himself, asserting that:  
“At the same time, we must carry those kinds of risks, thinking in the short term.. ..we 
must build a close relationship with President Trump too.. ..in that sense.. ..as Japan too 
we must be extremely sensitive. As such, I hope that the MOF can carry out opinion 
polls in the US properly and ensure a public relations campaign that builds positive 
feelings towards Japan”116 
In other words, Kira appeared to represent the concerns of many Japanese Diet members in 
effective advocacy of further integration with the US in the security sphere, but at the same 
time identifying Donald Trump as an individual risk (or liability) that requires careful 
management. 
  
Moreover, Diet minutes are suggestive of broader political convergence behind wider 
institutional change. Under the current LDP-led administration this leans in the direction of 
security risks being identified and acted upon globally and is observable across many of Japan’s 
governmental and advisory bodies. Furthermore, there are increasingly few lawmakers who 
(openly) oppose a flexible international role supported by more robust hardware and in closer 
cooperation with the US, as deemed essential to Japan’s security interests. At the highest levels, 
too, Foreign Minister, Fumio Kishida, for example, echoed Nakatani’s earlier argument when 
addressing a subsequent session of the Diet’s Security Committee; Kishida asserting simply 
that, “A strong US-Japan alliance is essential for the peace and prosperity of Japan and the 
region”117, before going on to outline how the new guidelines would further strengthen Tokyo-
Washington security ties.  
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This political rhetoric – framed as the identification of uncertain but expanding security risks 
– is now being acted upon extensively through practical acquisitions and military expenditure, 
informed by the concept of necessity for greater US-Japan interoperability. Japan’s expanded 
international role and risk-identification process has, therein, been coupled to its alliance with 
the US. This has included the development and acquisition of a range of new weapons, 
including, amongst others: amphibious assault vehicles, anti-submarine warfare helicopters, 
Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft (a hybrid between a conventional helicopter and turboprop plane), 
Global Hawk drones, fighter planes and moves towards the establishment of an Amphibious 
Rapid Deployment Brigade.118 These moves are in addition to Tokyo’s expansion, again in 
close cooperation with the US, into the fields of enhanced cyber-security capabilities, a possible 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) capability and the securitization of space119 
– a zone, like the Gulf of Aden, traditionally viewed outside of Japan’s immediate defense 
sphere! All of these issue-areas are also consistently tied into the broader identification of 
China as a primary source of security risks, even including in Djibouti itself. Indeed, the 
pronouncement of Japanese military power projection in Africa was overseen by Defence 
Minister, Inada, in open and direct competition with China.120 This marks a further institutional 
shift in the sense that the Japanese MOD at least now appears willing not only to promote its 
base in Djibouti without fear of a major public backlash, but also to trumpet its expansion as a 
response to increased Chinese military activity. The MOD is thereby leading the conflation of 
risks identified in areas surrounding Japan with those as far-a-field as the Horn of Africa.121   
 
Conclusion 
In sum, by examining how Japan’s political leaders and state institutions have recalibrated 
security risks related to the creation and operation of the military base on Djibouti, we can 
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observe the role of discourse-based framing in enacting a fundamental reshaping of Japan’s 
defence policies. Further, by reviewing the substantive legal changes enacted within core 
institutions, such as the presiding ministries, it becomes clear that these are working in 
alignment with shifts in mainstream political rhetoric. Under the current LDP-led 
administration this has reframed the normative expectations and understandings of Japan’s 
leading foreign policy organs, such as MOFA and the relatively recently empowered MOD. 
Subsequently, this has led in turn not only to the realization of well-documented legislative 
changes to Japan’s security policies, as embodied in the 2015 war bill, but also to the broader 
tacit acceptance of, or indifference towards, controversial overseas military installations, such 
as the base in Djibouti. In the case of this facility, policy appears to have moved from the 
construction of diverse risks to the implementation of exceptional measures without the linkage 
between them being clearly explicated to a wider audience.  
 
Examination of the base’s status and operational capabilities reveals that it is, in effect, now an 
indefinitely-termed, independently functioning facility, which operates as a hub for Japan’s de 
facto overseas armed forces, as well as a point-of-call for the highly armoured JCG. Given the 
potentially unconstitutional nature of these activities, the article has highlighted how – via a 
diversified risk narrative intersecting Japan’s state, market and society – activities on the 
Djibouti base have drawn markedly less attention, or opposition, than might have been 
expected. This is particularly salient when cognizant of the fact that they appear to have been 
framed by the government in a form that does not necessarily accurately reflect the base’s 
actual status and capabilities going forward. Its contentiousness is also further underlined by 
the facility’s official expansion and explicit linkage to Japan’s international rivalry with China, 
as well as the active promotion of interoperability with US forces – as Tokyo’s sole security 
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alliance partner – despite relatively low levels of in-country commercial investment from 
Japan’s business sector.  
 
In this regard, the recalibration of risks associated with various forms of international security 
(terrorism, piracy, energy security etc.) at the state level in Japan has been articulated through 
a discourse that either explicitly (proactive pacifism) or implicitly (bilateralism) promotes a 
shifting range of national norms. These serve to make possible a contingent set of previously 
politically problematic policy options, and include the ongoing erosion of Japan’s antimilitarist 
and isolationist social norms, in tandem with intensified US-Japanese security cooperation. As 
illustrated by the Djibouti case, this is allowing Tokyo to expand JSDF missions, diversify 
military roles and invest more in advanced hardware. Having recalibrated the risks, this can 
now be achieved without drawing the kind of intense domestic opposition witnessed in 
previous decades.122  
 
With US politics entering a seemingly altogether new phase under the presidency of Donald 
Trump, Japan can expect increased demands from Washington for greater burden-sharing and 
proactivity in the security sphere, which appear likely to increase the probability of armed 
combat. In conjunction with an Abe-led administration carrying Japan towards a more 
muscular global security role in the name of proactive pacifism, it would seem that Japan’s 
recalibration of (international) security risks might soon allow for the greater active use of its 
increasingly enhanced military capabilities. Therein, as the expansion of Japan’s base in 
Djibouti is coupled to these wider institutional changes, it appears that despite the lingering 
legal caveats ostensibly preventing embroilment in (US-led) warfare, it may only be a matter 
of time before the risk recalibration process carries Japan into a position where live shots are 
fired by Japanese armed forces overseas.   
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